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Abstract
In this paper I provide an exposition and critique of Johnson and Noorman’s (2014) 
three conceptualizations of the agential roles artificial systems can play. I argue 
that two of these conceptions are unproblematic: that of causally efficacious agency 
and “acting for” or surrogate agency. Their third conception, that of “autonomous 
agency,” however, is one I have reservations about. The authors point out that 
there are two ways in which the term “autonomy” can be used: there is, firstly, the 
engineering sense of the term, which simply refers to the ability of some system 
to act independently of substantive human control. Secondly, there is the moral 
sense of the term, which has traditionally grounded many notions of human mor-
al responsibility. I argue that the continued usage of “autonomy” in discussions 
of artificial agency complicates matters unnecessarily. This occurs in two ways: 
firstly, the condition of autonomy, even in its engineering sense, fails to accurately 
describe the way “autonomous” systems are developed in practice. Secondly, the 
continued usage of autonomy in the moral sense introduces unnecessary meta-
physical baggage form the free will debate into discussions about moral agency. In 
order to understand the debate surrounding autonomy, we would therefore first 
need to settle many seemingly intractable metaphysical questions regarding the 
existence of free will in human beings. 
Keywords: moral agency, autonomy, artificial agents, moral responsibility, 
free will
I. INTRODUCTION
Instead of asking the question of whether an entity is deserving of moral con-
cern, moral agency grapples with the question of whether an entity is capable 
of moral action. An agent is simply a being with the capacity to act (Schlosser 
2015). A moral action would therefore be a type of action for which evaluation 
using moral criteria would make sense. Inevitably, this type of discussion leads 
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to further questions concerning responsibility, as it is traditionally supposed that 
a moral action is one that an entity can be morally responsible for by being ac-
corded praise or blame for the action in question. This type of moral responsibi-
lity has historically been reserved for certain biological entities (generally, adult 
humans). However, the emergence of increasingly complex and autonomous 
artificial systems might call into question the assumption that human beings can 
consistently occupy this type of elevated ontological position while machines 
cannot. The key issue that arises in such discussions is one of attributability, and, 
more specifically, whether we can attribute the capacity for moral agency to an ar-
tificial agent. The ability to make such an ascription could lead to the resolution 
of potential “responsibility gaps” (Champagne–Tonkens 2013; Müller 2014; 
Gunkel 2017; Nyholm 2017): cases in which warranted moral attributions are 
currently indeterminate.1 As machines become increasingly autonomous, there 
could come a point at which it is no longer possible to discern whether or not 
any human error could in fact have been causally efficacious in bringing about a 
certain moral outcome (Grodzinsky–Miller–Wolf 2008. 121).
Of course, it is the capacity for moral agency that makes someone eligible for 
moral praise or blame, and thus for any ascription of moral responsibility (Talbert 
2019). Deborah Johnson is one author who has made a substantial and important 
contribution to discussions surrounding the moral roles machines may come to 
play in human society. Johnson claims that we should be weary of broadening 
the set of entities known as moral agents, such that they include machines. Her 
instrumentalist view of technology holds that technological artefacts are always 
embedded in certain contexts, and that the meaning of this context is deter-
mined by the values of human society. Machines are merely the executors of 
certain functions, with human beings setting the targets of these functions. She 
therefore maintains that artificial systems can only ever be moral entities, but 
never moral agents (Johnson 2006). 
It is with these considerations in mind that I will investigate how the con-
ceptual framework provided by Johnson and her various coauthors can help us 
better understand the potentially morally-laden roles that, increasingly, autono-
mous machines can come to fulfil in human society now and in the future. To do 
this, I provide an exposition of three types of agency that might prima facie be 
accorded to machines, posited by Johnson and Noorman (2014). Two of these 
types of agency are seemingly uncontroversial, as they deal with artefacts that 
operate in functionally equivalent ways when compared to human actions. The 
third conception, however, is much contested, as it deals with the autonomy of 
1  Conversely, “retribution gaps” may also arise. These are cases where there we have 
strong evidence that a machine was responsible (at least causally) for producing some moral 
harm. In such scenarios, people may feel the strong urge to punish somebody for the moral 
harm, but there may be no appropriate (human) target for this punishment (Nyholm 2017).
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the potential agent in question. It is also this sense of autonomy that grounds 
various notions of moral responsibility, and so, in order for agents to be moral 
agents, they must, supposedly, meet this requirement. Johnson argues that the 
moral sense of autonomy should be reserved for human beings, while the engi-
neering sense can successfully apply to machines. I will claim that the concept 
of autonomy cannot refer at the level of the design of artificial systems (at least 
for now) but may plausibly refer at the level of our descriptions of such systems. 
Moreover, I will show how Johnson’s specific sense of “moral autonomy” carries 
unnecessary metaphysical baggage. 
II. TYPES OF AGENCY
The metaphysics of agency is concerned with the relationship between actions 
and events. The most widely accepted metaphysical view of agency is event-caus-
al, whereby it is claimed that agency should be explained in terms of agent-in-
volving states and events (Schlosser 2015). In other words, agency should be 
understood in terms of causation, and, more specifically, in terms of the causal 
role the agent plays in the production of a certain event. Agents, therefore, are 
entities capable of having a certain effect on the world, where this effect usually 
corresponds to certain goals (in the form of desires, beliefs, intentions etc.) that 
the agent has. 
1. Causally efficacious agency
In the context of potential artificial agency, perhaps the most comprehensible 
conception of “agency”, as put forward by Johnson and Noorman (2014), is that 
of a causally efficacious entity. This conception of agency simply refers to the 
ability of some entities – specifically technological artefacts – to have a causal 
influence on various states of affairs, as extensions of the agency of the humans 
that produce and use them (ibid. 148). This includes artefacts that may be sep-
arated from humans in both time and space (for example, attitude control2 in a 
spacecraft in orbit around the earth) as well as artefacts that are deployed direct-
ly by a human being. A fair question to raise at this juncture is whether it in fact 
makes sense to consider these types of artefacts agents at all. One option is to 
conceptualize them as tools instead. The reason for preferring the terminology 
of “agent” as opposed to “tool” is that these artefacts have human intentions 
programmed/encoded into them (Johnson 2006. 202). This is in contrast to a tool, 
2  Attitude control is the controlling of the orientation of an object with reference to an 
inertial frame, or another entity (e.g. a nearby object, the celestial sphere, etc.).
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such as a hammer, which may be used by someone to perform a specific task but 
does not have the specifications of this task as part of its very make-up. It cannot 
in any way perform or represent the task independently of human manipulation. 
The key distinction then between a tool and a technological artefact, according 
to Johnson, is that the latter has a form of intentionality as a key feature of its 
make-up, while the former does not (ibid. 201).3 In this sense, referring to the 
intentionality of technology would denote the fact that technological artefacts 
are designed in certain ways to achieve certain outcomes. Consider the simple 
example of a search engine: keys are pressed in a specific order in an appropriate 
box and then a button is pressed. The search engine then goes through a set of 
processes that have been programmed into it by a human being. The “reasons” 
for the program doing what it does are therefore necessarily tethered to the in-
tentions of the human being that created it.
It makes sense to think of such artefacts as possessing “agency” to the extent 
that the ubiquity and specific design of these types of artefacts make a differ-
ence to the effective outcomes available to us. For example, they make possible 
novel means with which to achieve our ends by increasing the amount of poten-
tial action schemes at our disposal (Illies–Meijers 2009. 422). These artefacts 
can therefore be thought of as enlarging the possible range of actions available 
to a particular agent in a given situation. Yet, while it is clear that artefacts can 
thus have causal efficacy in the sense that they may contribute to the creation of 
certain novel states of affairs, this causal contribution is only efficacious in con-
junction with the actions of human beings (Johnson–Noorman 2014. 149). The 
reason we can think of these causally efficacious artefacts as agents is the fact 
that they make substantial causal contributions to certain outcomes. In this way 
the causal efficaciousness of an entity leads, in the form of a non-trivial action 
performed by that entity, to a specific event. 
As suggested earlier, we can legitimately think of these artefacts as agents, 
due to the fact that their manufacturers have certain intentions (aims) when 
designing and creating them, and so these systems have significance in relation 
to humans (Johnson–Noorman 2014. 149). The type of agency that we can ex-
tend to artefacts under this conception would thus not be one that involves any 
meaningful sense of responsibility on the part of the artefact, and, by extension, 
would not entail a distinctly moral type of agency. While Johnson and Noorman 
concede that artefacts can be causally efficacious in the production of various 
states of affairs, their (the artefacts’) contribution in this regard is always in com-
bination with that of human beings (ibid. 149). On this conception of agency, 
3  The intentionality of the program should be understood in functional terms, according 
to Johnson (2006. 202). What this means is that the functionality of these systems has been 
intentionally created by human designers, and so is necessarily tethered to and wholly deter-
mined by human intentions. Human intentions, in this sense, provide the “reasons” why the 
technological artefact acts in a particular way.
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therefore, we can only consider entities that act in “causal conjunction” with 
human beings. 
The next conception of “agency” that I will unpack can be employed for 
machines that perform tasks on behalf of, but independently from, human ope-
rators and so can be seen as a special case of causally efficacious agency. 
2. “Acting for” agency
This conception of agency focuses on artefacts that act on behalf of human ope-
rators in a type of “surrogate” role (Johnson–Powers 2008; Johnson–Noorman 
2014). In an analogous way, when it comes to human beings, surrogate agency 
occurs when one person acts on behalf of another. In these cases, the surrogate 
agent is meant to represent a client, and therefore is constrained by certain rules 
and has certain responsibilities imposed upon them.4 This type of agency in-
volves a type of representation: the surrogate agent is meant to use his or her 
expertise to perform tasks and provide assistance to and act as a representative 
of the client, but does not act out of his or her own accord in that capacity (John-
son–Noorman 2014. 149). When it comes to artificial systems, this “acting for” 
type of agency occurs in those artefacts that replace or act on behalf of humans in 
certain domains. Take the example of a stockbroker: in the past, in order to have 
a trade executed, one would have to phone a stockbroker and request the pur-
chase/sale of a specific share. The stockbroker, acting on your behalf, would then 
find a willing buyer/seller in the market and execute the trade. The reality today 
is much different: individuals can now create accounts on trading platforms and 
buy shares online without the need of a stockbroker. Furthermore, the exchang-
es on which these trades are made are also run by computers: inputting a “sell 
order” places your request in an order book, but this order book is not a literal 
one, as it might have been in the past, and so there is no need to leave the com-
fort of your home to perform these tasks. Current online order books are fluid, 
competitive spaces in which high frequency trading occurs, without the need for 
humans to keep record, as this job is taken care of by the computer powering the 
system.5 Technical details aside, what the aforementioned example brings to 
light is how tasks that were once the exclusive domain of human beings are now 
performed by artificial systems without too much “hands-on” human involve-
4  For example, lawyers in certain legal systems are not allowed to represent clients whose 
interests may conflict with that of another client. 
5  Another interesting development in automated trading has been the explosion of this 
technology as it applies to cryptocurrency markets. These markets have been heavily impact-
ed by the emergence of “trading bots” which replace the individual as the executor of a buy/
sell instruction. The human operator simply inputs certain key parameters and the bot does 
the rest.
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ment. The function of the tasks performed by these systems, however, is still 
the same: the purpose of an automated trade is still the same as a trade executed 
by a human, as in both cases the end being pursued is the purchase/sale of some 
share at the behest of a given client. What has changed, however, is the means 
by which that specific end is obtained – the artefact acts within given parameters 
but does not have each action specifically stipulated by a human operator. Some 
authors (Johnson 2006; Johnson–Powers 2008; Johnson–Noorman 2014) go on to 
claim that because of this, these technological artefacts have a greater degree of 
intentionality than causally efficacious agents do. The causally efficacious agent 
is simply one that had an influence on outcomes in conjunction with human 
beings. The “acting for” agent, on Johnson and Noorman’s construal, should be 
understood in terms of an analogy: it can be useful to think of artificial systems 
as if they acted on our behalf (in an analogous way to how a lawyer represents 
their client), but the decisions they make are not the same as the ones made by 
human beings. The range of actions available to them is still a direct function 
of the intentions of their programmers/designers, and is in this sense “deter-
mined”, whereas human action, according to Johnson and Noorman at least, 
is not. These agents differ from causally efficacious agents in that they have a 
greater degree of independence from direct human intervention, and thus have 
human intentionality modelled into their potential range of actions to a greater 
degree than the causally efficacious agent does.
Johnson claims that when we evaluate the behaviour of computer systems 
“there is a triad of intentionality at work, the intentionality of the computer 
system designer, the intentionality of the system, and the intentionality of the 
user” (Johnson 2006. 202; Johnson–Powers 2005).6 Nevertheless, these artefacts, 
in order to function as desired, are fundamentally anchored to their human de-
signers and users (Johnson 2006. 202). This is true of systems whose proximate 
behaviour is independent of human operators, as even in such cases, the func-
tioning of the system is determined by its design and use, and both of these 
aspects involve human agents. These human agents have internal mental states 
such as beliefs, desires, etc., and, according to Johnson (ibid. 198), it is here that 
we locate “original” intentionality (and hence, according to Johnson, the respon-
sibility for any of the system’s actions)
If the tasks that are delegated to these kinds of artificial agents have moral 
consequences, this would provide another way in which to conceptualize the 
role such artefacts could play in our moral lives (Johnson–Noorman 2014. 155). 
Consider, for example, automatic emergency braking (AEB) technology, which 
automatically applies the brakes when it detects an object near the front of the 
vehicle. This simple system has been enormously successful, and research indi-
cates that it could lead to reductions in “pedestrian crashes, right turn crashes, 
6  Johnson and Powers (2005. 100) refer to this as “Technological Moral Action” (TMA).
MORAL AGENTS OR MINDLESS MACHINES? 15
head on crashes, rear end crashes and hit fixed object crashes” (Doecke et al. 
2012). We can usefully think of AEB as assisting us in being better and safer 
drivers, leading to decreased road fatalities and injuries. These artificial systems, 
of which AEB is an example, can therefore be seen as performing delegated 
tasks which can have moral significance. We can therefore meaningfully think 
of them as being morally relevant entities. However, according to Johnson (2006), 
because of the type of intentionality these entities have, they cannot be consid-
ered to be moral agents. Johnson claims that the intentionality that we can accord 
to technological artefacts is only a product of the intentionality of a designer 
and a user, and so this intentionality is moot without some human input (ibid. 
201). When designers engage in the process of producing an artefact, they create 
them to act in a specific way, and these artefacts remain determined to behave 
in this way. While human users can introduce novel inputs, the conjunction of 
designer- and user-intentionality wholly determines the type of intentionality 
exhibited by these types of computer systems (ibid. 201). Therefore, while it is 
reasonable to assess the significance of the delegated tasks performed by these 
artefacts as potentially giving rise to moral consequences, it would be a category 
mistake “to claim that humans and artefacts are interchangeable components 
in moral action” in such instances (Johnson–Noorman 2014. 153). For example, 
consider the type of moral appraisal we might accord to a traffic light versus a 
traffic officer directing traffic: while these two entities are, in a functional sense, 
performing the same task, they are not morally the same (Johnson–Miller 2008. 
129; Johnson–Noorman 2014. 153). 
In order to press this point further, Johnson and Miller draw a distinction 
between “scientific” and “operational” models and how we evaluate each one 
respectively (2008. 129). According to the authors, scientific models are tested 
against the real world, and, in this way, these types of models are constrained by 
the natural world (ibid. 129). For example, we can be sure we have a good model 
of a physical system when our model of this system accurately represents what 
actually occurs in the natural world. Operational models, on the other hand, have 
no such constraints (besides, of course, their physical/programmed constraints). 
These models are aimed at achieving maximum utility: they are designed to re-
alise specific outcomes without the need to model or represent what is actually 
going on in the natural world (ibid. 129). For example, a trading bot (as discussed 
above) need not in any way model human thinking before executing a trade. All 
that is important for such a bot, for example, is that it generate the maximum 
amount of profit given certain constraints. Moreover, the efficacy of such sys-
tems is often exactly that they exceed the utility provided by human decision 
making, usually in cases where complex mathematical relationships between 
numerous variables need to be calculated. In light of this, Johnson and Miller 
argue that because only the function of the tasks is the same (when comparing 
human action to operational models), we should not think of such systems as 
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moral agents, as this would reduce morality to functionality, an idea which they 
are directly opposed to (ibid. 129). For now, all that should be noted is that ar-
tefacts can be agents that, when acting on behalf of human beings, participate 
in acts that have moral consequences. This, however, does not necessarily mean 
they are morally responsible for the actions they participate in bringing about: 
once again, in the current literature, this responsibility is reserved for human 
beings. In order to be morally responsible, an agent must also have autonomy. 
3. Autonomous agency
The third and final conceptualization of agency to be dealt with is that of auto-
nomous agency. On the face of it, there are two ways in which we might come to 
understand the “autonomous” aspect of this account. Firstly, there is the type 
of autonomy that we usually ascribe to human beings. This type of autonomy 
has a distinctly moral dimension and, according to Johnson and Noorman (2014. 
151), it is due to our autonomy in this sense that we have the capacity for moral 
agency. “True” autonomy is often used in discussions of moral agency as the 
key ingredient which supports idea that only human beings qualify as moral 
agents, as we are the only entities with the capacity for this kind of autonomy 
(see Johnson 2006, 2015; Johnson–Miller 2008; Johnson–Powers 2008; Johnson– 
Noorman 2014). Hence, it is due to the fact that individual human beings act 
for reasons that they can claim “authorship” for, that they can be said to be truly 
autonomous and this is what allows us to hold one another morally responsible 
for our actions (also see Wegner 2002. 2). According to Johnson and Noorman 
(2014. 151) if a being does not have the capacity to choose freely how to act, then 
it makes no sense to have a set of rules specifying how such an entity ought to 
behave. In other words, the type of autonomy requisite for moral agency here 
can be stated as the capacity to choose freely how one acts (ibid. 151).  
However, there is a second understanding of “autonomous agency” that 
has to do with how we might define it in a non-moral, engineering sense. This 
sense of autonomy simply refers to artefacts that are capable of operating in-
dependently of human control (Johnson–Noorman 2014. 151). Computer sci-
entists commonly refer to “autonomous” programs in order to highlight their 
ability to carry out tasks on behalf of humans and, furthermore, to do so in a 
highly independent manner (Alonso 2014). A simplistic example of such a sys-
tem might be a machine-learning algorithm which is better equipped to operate 
in novel environments than a simple, pre-programmed algorithm. Nevertheless, 
this capacity for operational or functional independence is, according to Johnson 
and Noorman (2014. 152), not sufficient to ground a coherent account of moral 
agency, since, as they argue, such agents do not freely choose how to act in any 
meaningful sense. So, while the authors do not suggest we eliminate the stand-
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ard convention of speaking about “autonomous” machines, they insist on care-
fully articulating which sense of autonomy is being used. “True” autonomy, on 
their view, should be reserved for human beings. We should be sensitive to 
the specific sense of autonomy we mobilise, as confusing the two senses spec-
ified here can lead to misunderstandings that may have moral consequences 
(ibid. 152).
To see how this might play out, it will be helpful to consider how the concep-
tion of “truly” autonomous agency not only grounds morality as such, but also 
confers a particular kind of moral status on its holder (ibid. 155). As stated above, 
this conception of agency has historically served the purpose of distinguishing 
humans from other entities. As noted above, the traditional means by which this 
has been achieved is by postulating that human beings exercise a distinct type 
of freedom in their decision making, which is what grounds a coherent sense of 
moral responsibility. Freedom in this sense is about having meaningful control 
over one’s actions, a type of control which makes a decision or action up to the 
agent and not other external circumstances. It is possible for agents of this kind to 
have done otherwise – they deliberately and freely choose their actions. More-
over, the sense of freedom described above has a sense of autonomy embedded 
into its definition: if this free decision is not the product of the specific agent in 
question, and is rather due to external pressures, then we cannot meaningfully 
consider the action to be free, and hence we would be hard-pressed to hold the 
agent in question morally responsible for such an act. An example of such a de-
cision would be if an agent was coerced into performing some action (perhaps 
by physical force or by psychological manipulation), in which case we would not 
consider the act to have been performed “freely”.
These apparent differences in capacity for autonomous action also influence 
the types of rights we can coherently accord to various entities. On the basis of 
being autonomous moral agents, humans are accorded several clusters of posi-
tive and negative rights, and differences in the type of moral standing we pos-
sess can alter the kinds of rights we are extended (ibid. 155). For example, in 
democratic states there is a minimum legal voting age. One justification for this 
type of law is the claim that one should only be allowed to vote when one reach-
es an age of political maturity: an age at which one can exercise the necessary 
capacities to consciously make a well-informed vote. In this instance, one’s capacity 
to make informed – and hence, ostensibly free – political decisions, captured in 
a minimum voting age, comes to inform the type of rights one is conferred (i.e. 
the right to vote). It is against this background that it is argued that we should 
be careful to distinguish between the two conceptions of autonomous agency 
identified here and realise that artefacts should not be understood as having the 
morally relevant kind of autonomy, as we cannot reasonably consider them to be 
choosing freely how they act. Their actions are always tethered to the intentions 
of their designers and end users. 
18 FABIO TOLLON
III. PROBLEMATISING AUTONOMY 
To reiterate, Johnson argues that we should be cognisant of the distinction be-
tween “autonomy” as it is used in the engineering sense, and “autonomy” as 
it is used when applied to human beings, especially in the context of moral 
theorising. The engineering sense refers to how an entity may be able to op-
erate outside human control; the moral sense refers to a “special” capacity that 
human beings have, elevating us above the natural world and making us mor-
ally responsible for our actions. In what follows, I will raise two issues with the 
continued usage of “autonomy” in discussions surrounding AI. The first issue 
is more general and applies to the engineering sense, while the second issue is 
directed at Johnson’s specific usage of autonomy in the moral sense. The first 
issue relates to the design of AI systems, while the second relates to the descrip-
tion of such systems. 
1. Losing the definitional baggage 
By “autonomous” what is usually meant is the ability of an entity to change 
states without being directly caused to do so by some external influence.7 This 
is a very weak sense of the term (in contrast with the way it is traditionally un-
derstood in moral and/or political philosophy) but the basic idea can be grasped 
with this definition.8 It captures the major distinction between how the term is 
used in the design of AI systems and how it refers when applied to human be-
ings: the engineering sense and the so-called “moral” sense. In AI research, one 
of the main goals of creating machine intelligence is to create systems that can 
act autonomously in the engineering sense: reasoning, thinking and acting on 
their own, without human intervention (Alterman 2000. 15; Van de Voort–Pieters– 
Consoli 2015. 45). This is a design specification that has almost reached the level 
of ideology in AI research and development (Etzioni–Etzioni 2016). When we 
use this “weak” sense of autonomy, we are usually referring to how a specific AI 
system has been designed. More specifically, we aim to pick out a system that is 
able to act independently of human control. 
However, as argued by Alterman (2000. 19), identifying machine autonomy 
is already problematic, as the distinction between the non-autonomous “get-
ting ready” stage and the autonomous “running” stage in the design of a spe-
7  Changing states simply refers to an entity’s ability to update its internal model of the 
world by considering new information from its environment. This can be as simple as a ther-
mostat keeping the temperature at a set level despite the temperature dropping in the envi-
ronment (Floridi and Sanders, 2004).
8  For example, see Christman (2018) for an exposition on how autonomy refers in the 
moral and political arenas. 
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cific AI system is a spurious one at best. In the first “getting ready” stage, a 
system is prepared for deployment in some task environment. In the second 
stage, the system “runs” according to its design (ibid. 19). Traditionally, it was 
supposed that these two stages are what separate the “autonomous” from the 
“non-autonomous” states of the machine. However, consider a case where a 
system has completed the “getting ready” stage and is ready to “run”, and sup-
pose that while entering its “running” state in its given task environment, the 
system encounters an error. In such a situation, it would be necessary to take 
the system back into the “getting ready” stage in the hope of fixing the bug. In 
this way, there is a cycling between the “getting ready” and “running” stages, 
which entails cycling between stages of “autonomous” and “non-autonomous” 
learning (ibid. 19). This means that the system’s “intelligence” is a function of 
both stages, and so it becomes unclear where we should be drawing the line be-
tween what counts as autonomous or non-autonomous in terms of the states of 
the machine. According to Alterman, “if the system is intelligent, credit largely 
goes to how it was developed which is a joint person–machine practice” (ibid. 
20). In other words, if the system is considered intelligent, this is already largely 
a carbon-silicon collaborative effort. Instead of asking whether the system is 
autonomous or not then, we should perhaps instead inquire as to how its be-
haviour might be independent from its human designers. What this entails, for 
my purposes, is that when talking about the design of AI systems we should not 
talk about “autonomous” AI. If autonomy means “independence from human 
control” then this concept cannot refer at the level of design, as at this level of 
description, human beings are still very much involved in moving the system 
from the “getting ready” stage to the “running” stage. The implications of this 
for Johnson’s argument, therefore, are that we need not worry about any confu-
sion regarding the autonomy of AI systems, as the engineering sense of the term 
fails to refer successfully.9
2. Losing the metaphysical baggage
Johnson claims that there is something “mysterious” and unique about human 
behaviour, and that this mysterious, non-deterministic aspect of human deci-
sion-making makes us “free”, and therefore morally responsible for our actions 
(Johnson 2006. 200). Details of the philosophical debate surrounding free will is 
not something I would wish for anyone to have to explore in full, but my senti-
9  This is not to deny that in the future we may come to encompass machines that are 
autonomous in this sense. This would entail that they are capable of setting their own goals 
and updating their own programming. My intuition is that this outcome is inevitable, but 
substantiation of this claim is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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ment towards this debate is no substitute for an argument. The real issue with 
gesturing towards human freedom as a way of grounding our moral autonomy is 
that one then brings metaphysically contested claims from the free will litera-
ture into a debate about moral agency. Johnson’s claim rests on the fact that she 
presupposes some form of incompatibilism10, more specifically libertarianism11 
(about free will, not politics). This is a controversial position to hold and is in no 
way the generally accepted view in philosophical debates on free will (O’Con-
nor–Franklin 2019). There are philosophers who have spent considerable time 
arguing against such incompatibilist positions (see Dennett 1984, 2003; Pere-
boom 2003, 2014; cf. Kane 1996). In order to understand the debate surrounding 
autonomy, we would therefore first need to settle many (seemingly intractable) 
metaphysical questions regarding the existence of free will in human beings. In 
this way, her argument that the “freedom” of human decision making is what 
grounds the special type of autonomy that we apparently have generates far 
more problems than solutions.
My claim, therefore, is that this sense of autonomy, as Johnson uses it in her 
description of AI systems, invites confusion. For example, the most common us-
age of the term “autonomous” in discussions on machine ethics usually revolves 
around military applications (see Sparrow 2007; Müller 2014). A key issue here, 
however, can be noted in the metaphysical baggage that comes with the as-
cription of autonomy to a system. To see how this may play out in actual philo-
sophical discourse, consider the following remark by Sparrow, where he claims 
that “autonomy and moral responsibility go hand in hand” (2007. 65).12 On this 
analysis, any system that is deemed autonomous (for example, a military drone), 
and were to cause some moral harm, would be morally responsible for this harm 
(ibid.). This would miss key steps in the analysis, as in such a situation, we skip 
from autonomy to responsibility without, for example, asking whether the entity 
is also adaptable (Floridi–Sanders 2004). 
Returning to the military drone above: imagine it is sent to execute a strike 
on a certain pre-determined location. This location is programmed (by a hu-
man) into the drone before it takes off, but from the moment of take-off, the 
drone acts autonomously in executing the strike. Let us assume that the strike 
is unsuccessful, as instead of terrorists, civilians were at the strike location. In 
this case, while the drone is autonomous, we would not hold the drone morally 
10  This view claims that the truth of determinism is incompatible with freely willed human 
action.
11  Libertarians claim that determinism rules out free will but make the further point that 
our world is in fact indeterministic. It is in these indeterminacies that human decision-making 
occurs, with the implication that these decisions are free, as they are not necessarily bound to 
any antecedent causal events and laws that would make them perfectly predictable.
12  Note that Sparrow (2007) does explicitly state that he remains agnostic on questions of 
full machine autonomy.
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responsible for this outcome, as the moral harm was due to human error. In this 
weak sense, the criterion of autonomy would provide an implausible account 
of agency more generally, as it would never allow for minimally “autonomous” 
machines that are not morally responsible for their actions. The aforementioned 
case is clearly an oversimplification of the issue, but what the example brings to 
light is that our ascriptions of autonomy need not be synonymous with those of 
moral responsibility. Therefore, it should be clear that autonomy does not also 
necessitate moral responsibility on the part of the agent. This leaves room for 
autonomous systems that are not morally responsible for their actions.
I therefore suggest that we keep the concepts of autonomy and moral respon-
sibility distinct. Johnson unnecessarily conflates the two (in the case of humans) 
in order to show how machines can never be “fully autonomous”. This attitude 
however misses key nuances in the debate surrounding machine autonomy and 
glosses over the fact that it is possible for some systems to be semi-autonomous 
(such as the one in the drone strike example). Her specific sense of autono-
my (by tethering it to the kind of autonomy exhibited by human beings with 
free will) also introduces unnecessary metaphysical baggage into the discussion. 
There are far more naturalistically plausible accounts of autonomy which do 
not involve such metaphysical speculation. Examples of this could be that au-
tonomy is the ability to act in accordance with one’s aims, the ability to govern 
oneself, the ability to act free of coercion or manipulation, etc. (see Christman 
2018 for discussion). It is beyond the scope of this paper, however, to provide a 
positive account of autonomy. Rather, my purpose has been to critically evaluate 
the specific conception of the term put forward by Johnson. I leave the crucial 
work of providing such a positive account to other philosophers.  
IV. CONCLUSION
I began by introducing the concept of agency, and, more specifically, that of 
moral agency. I then provided an exposition of three distinct types of agen-
cy that we might reasonably accord to artificial systems. While I argued that 
the three conceptualizations of agency introduced capture many of the ways 
in which we can meaningfully consider the roles that artificial artefacts play, I 
expressed reservations regarding the third one of these, that of the “autonomy” 
condition in our philosophizing about moral agency. I claimed that the conti-
nued usage of such a metaphysically loaded term complicates our ability to get a 
good handle on our concepts and obscures the ways in which we can coherently 
think through nuanced accounts of the moral role(s) that machines may come to 
play in our lives. 
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